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COMMENTS
NOERR PETITIONING IMMUNITY
EXTENDED TO ATTEMPTS TO
INFLUENCE FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS:
COASTAL STATES MARKETING, INC. V.
HUNT
The Sherman1 and Clayton 2 Acts were promulgated to en-
courage competition and to prevent "restraints upon freedom of
trade."' The Supreme Court's interpretation of the antitrust laws
- Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-
7 (1982)).
2 Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 1, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-
27 (1982)).
'L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 14 (1977). The primary antitrust
enforcement provision of the Sherman Act provides that "[e]very contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). The
Supreme Court, however, has interpreted the Sherman Act to prevent only "unreasonable"
restraints of trade. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 87 (1911) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). In order to prevent economic harm from re-
straints of trade, Congress exercised the full scope of its power under the commerce clause
in enacting the provisions of the Sherman Act. Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United
States, 286 U.S. 427, 435 (1932); Fischel, Antitrust Liability for Attempts to Influence Gov-
ernment Action: The Basis and Limits of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. Cm. L.
REv. 80, 84 (1977). Because of the broad language of the Sherman Act, however, the Court
has at times struggled with its application. See generally M. HANDLER, H. BLAKE, R. PrroF-
SKY & H. GOLDSCHMID, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADE REGULATIONS 11 (1975) (noting the
conflict between the legislative intent "to protect equal opportunity and equal access for
small business" and the desire to promote competition). Caution must be observed when the
legislative history of the Sherman Act.is analyzed because, to a large extent, "Congress sim-
ply had no discoverable intention that would help a court decide a case one way or the
other." Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Divi-
sion, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 783 (1965).
The provisions of the Sherman Act were supplemented by the enactment of the Clayton
Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§12-27 (1982)).
Section 3 of the Clayton Act measures the legality of both foreclosure agreements, see
Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327-29 (1961), and tying arrangements,
see International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947). Section 7 provides:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly,. . . the
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permits few immunities from government regulation of anticompe-
titive conduct.4 One such immunity, recognized by the Court in
Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc.,5 permits joint petitioning efforts which are intended to influ-
stock. . . [or] assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in
any line of commerce. . . in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisi-
tion may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982); see General Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 415 U.S. 486, 510-11
(1974); United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 657-58 (1964); United States
v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 78, 86 (D. Colo. 1975).
Another enforcement provision of the antitrust laws is the Federal Trade Commission
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1982), which prohibits "[u]nfair methods of competition in or af-
fecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce ......
Id. § 45(a)(1) (1982).
4 See, e.g., Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 398 (1978); Cantor
v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 600 (1976); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
State action immunity, established in Parker, exempts activity undertaken by state govern-
ments from Sherman Act scrutiny. 317 U.S. at 351. In Parker, the State of California, pur-
suant to the California Agricultural Prorate Act, adopted a program to market agricultural
products in a more efficient manner. Id. at 346. The Act authorized state officials to prevent
competition among growers and thereby to raise the price of the products shipped to pack-
ers. Id. Pursuant to the Act, the Director of Agriculture established a proration program for
the marketing of raisins grown within a "defined production zone." Id. at 346-49. Analyzing
the legislative history of the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court noted that there is no indica-
tion that the Act was intended to restrain state action or private action directed by the
state. Id. at 351. The Court reasoned that the Act was designed to eliminate restraints on
competition that were generated by individuals and corporations, id., and concluded that
the action taken by the State to enforce the proration program was not a Sherman Act
violation, id. at 351-52.
The state action exemption was refined in Lafayette, 435 U.S. 389 (1978), and Cantor,
428 U.S. 579 (1976). In Lafayette, a Louisiana statute permitted the cities of Lafayette and
Plaquemine to "own and operate electric utility systems both within and beyond their city
limits." 435 U.S. at 391 (footnote omitted). The cities claimed that the Louisiana Power and
Light Co. violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by engaging in boycotts, "sham
litigation," the foreclosure of suppliers, and other illegal tactics intended to thwart the con-
struction of a power plant. Id. at 392 n.5. The defendants made similar allegations in their
counterclaim, which the plaintiffs sought to dismiss by asserting that the Parker state ac-
tion exemption shielded their conduct. Id. at 392. The Court found no policy considerations
sufficient to immunize municipalities from the antitrust laws. Id. at 408. In Cantor, Detroit
Edison, a supplier of electricity to several million consumers in Michigan, was allegedly vio-
lating the Sherman Act by distributing light bulbs to its customers free of charge. 428 U.S.
at 581. The Michigan Public Service Commission (the PSC) approved the rates charged by
Detroit Edison and the distribution of light bulbs without charge. Id. at 582. The plaintiff, a
druggist who sold light bulbs, alleged that Detroit Edison had utilized its monopoly power
in electricity to restrain competition in light bulbs. Id. at 581. The Supreme Court held that
the state action exemption would not apply to Detroit Edison, reasoning that "neither
Michigan's approval of the tariff filed by [Detroit Edison] nor the fact that the lamp-ex-
change program may not be terminated until a new tariff is filed, is a sufficient basis for
implying an exemption from the federal antitrust laws for that program." Id. at 598.
8 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
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ence government action with respect to the passage or enforcement
of trade laws." The Supreme Court, however, has left undecided
the applicability of this "petitioning" immunity to attempts to in-
fluence foreign governments.7 Recently, in Coastal States Market-
ing, Inc. v. Hunt,' the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ex-
tended the immunity enunciated in Noerr, holding that joint
efforts to influence foreign sovereigns are not violative of the anti-
trust laws.9
In 1957, the Government of Libya granted an oil concession to
Nelson Bunker Hunt.10 Hunt assigned interests to his two brothers
and to the British Petroleum Company (BP).11 By 1967, the Hunts
and BP had developed the concession into a productive oil field.1 2
After the Libyan Government nationalized the oil interests in
1973, the Hunts notified potential oil purchasers of their title
claims's and joined in a number of lawsuits initiated by BP, claim-
ing title to the petroleum.1
4
' Id. at 137.
See Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & W. Indus., 473 F. Supp. 680, 690 n.3
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("[it] is an open question whether that doctrine, which protects legitimate
attempts to petition the United States government, has any application to the lobbying of
foreign governments"); Davis, Solicitation of Anticompetitive Action From Foreign Govern-
ments: Should the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine Apply to Communications with Foreign
Sovereigns?, 11 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 395, 397 (1981). In Occidental Petroleum Corp. v.
Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), affd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972), Judge Pregerson opined that Noerr petitioning immunity is not
extended to activities undertaken outside the United States. Id. at 108 (dictum). The court
noted that one issue in Noerr involved first amendment considerations which have no appli-
cability to the petitioning of foreign governments. Id. Recognizing that Noerr emphasized
free access to the "representative democracy," the district court concluded that "[t]he per-
suasion of Middle Eastern states alleged in the present case is a far cry from the political
process with which Noerr was concerned." Id.; see also United States v. AMAX Inc., 1977-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,467, at 71,799 (N.D. 11. May 6, 1977) (Noerr petitioning immunity
deemed inapplicable to efforts undertaken to influence the Canadian Government).
8 694 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1983).
" Id. at 1366.
10 Id. at 1360. By the terms of the oil concession, Hunt was given the exclusive right to
"'search for. . . and extract petroleum'. . . and 'to use, process, store, export and dispose
of the same'" for a period of 50 years. Id.
:2 Id. Hunt assigned a 50% interest to BP in 1960. Id.
12 Id.
18 Id. The Government of Libya assigned the concession to the Arabian Gulf Explora-
tion Co. (AGEC), as it previously had done with BP's interest. Id. The Hunts' response was
to publish worldwide their title claim to the nationalized oil and to notify anyone handling
the oil, including Coastal, of its claim. Id.
14 Id. BP investigators traced the sale and transportation of the disputed oil and filed
29 lawsuits in numerous countries. Id. A BP director wrote to Nelson Bunker Hunt, sug-
gesting "'joint action to protect our respective rights.'" Id. Thereafter, the Hunts joined in
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The plaintiff, Coastal States Marketing, Inc., purchased the
nationalized oil from a Libyan Government agency.15 As a result of
the Hunts' communications to potential oil purchasers, attempts
by Coastal to sell the nationalized oil were frustrated.16 Coastal
filed an antitrust action claiming that the Hunts' actions consti-
tuted a conspiracy in restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman
Act.17 The district court granted the Hunts' motion for a directed
verdict, concluding that the activity was protected under the Noerr
doctrine. 8
The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Sherman Act does
not "penalize" the petitioning of a foreign government agency.19
Judge Rubin, writing for a unanimous court,20 summarily dis-
missed Coastal's contention that the Hunts' activity constituted an
actionable boycott.2 In response to Coastal's argument that Noerr
petitioning immunity is based on first amendment rights and
therefore, limited to concerted efforts to influence domestic offi-
cials,22 Judge Rubin reasoned that the doctrine of petitioning im-
21 of the suits filed by BP. Id. The parties discontinued the litigation after settling with the
Libyan Government. Id. at 1361-62.
15 Id. at 1360. In response to Coastal's purchase of oil from AGEC, the Hunts and BP
instituted a conversion action against Coastal in a Texas state court. Id. at 1361. In a coun-
terclaim, Coastal alleged tortious interference with business relations. Id. Neither party was
granted recovery, id., and the decision was affirmed on appeal, id. at 1361 & n.7; see Hunt v.
Coastal States Gas Producing Co., 570 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978), aft'd, 583
S.W.2d 322, 326 (Tex.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979). In another action, Hunt at-
tempted to attach a cargo of oil that Coastal had imported to the United States on the oil
tanker Hilda, but the claim was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See Hunt v. A Cargo of
Petroleum Products Laden on the Steam Tanker Hilda, 378 F. Supp. 701, 702-03 (E.D. Pa.
1974), aff'd mem., 515 F.2d 506 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 869 (1975).
16 694 F.2d at 1361.
17 Id. Coastal sought economic recovery for lost profits on the sale of its rights to
purchase the nationalized oil, as well as recovery for penalties incurred in failing to utilize
processing time at a refinery in Italy. Id.
'B Id. at 1363.
19 Id. at 1366.
:0 Judge Rubin was joined by Judges Randall and Jolly.
'1 694 F.2d at 1364. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that "[t]he mere fact that a boycott
forms a part of the petitioning conduct does not vitiate the immunity of such conduct." Id.;
see Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc., v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 542-43 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979).
21 694 F.2d at 1364. The determination of whether the Noerr doctrine is based on con-
stitutional or statutory grounds is crucial in ascertaining whether the doctrine extends to
foreign governments:
'If the Noerr-Pennington doctrine were based on statutory construction of
the Sherman Act,... it would be difficult to argue that Congress intended at-
tempts to influence our government to be exempt but not similar attempts to in-
fluence a foreign government .... Since there is no first amendment right to
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munity also is based on a statutory construction of the Sherman
Act.2 3  Although subsequent Supreme Court decisions have
"stressed the first amendment underpinnings" of Noerr, the
Coastal court concluded that Noerr immunity, based on an inter-
pretation of the Sherman Act, was not thereby abolished.24 Indeed,
the Supreme Court has on several occasions subsequent to Noerr
"reaffirmed" its conclusion that Noerr petitioning immunity is
based on a construction of the Sherman Act.25 The Coastal court
thus deemed it proper to conclude that "petitioning immunity is
not limited to the domestic political arena. "28
petition a foreign government, attempts to influence such governments should not
be protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.'
Davis, supra note 7, at 398 (quoting Fischel, supra note 3, at 120-21).
25 694 F.2d at 1364 & n.21 (citing Noerr, 365 U.S. at 138). The court relied on the
language of Noerr, in which the Supreme Court stated that the Sherman Act does not pro-
hibit activities consisting of" 'mere solicitation of governmental action with respect to the
passage and enforcement of the laws.'" 694 F.2d at 1364 n.21 (quoting Noerr, 365 U.S. at
138). In addition, the Coastal court quoted Senator Sherman's statement that the Act was
not intended to prohibit associations from voicing partisan interests. 694 F.2d at 1364 n.21;
see infra note 35.
24 694 F.2d at 1365; see, e.g., California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404
U.S. 508, 510-11 (1972); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
25 694 F.2d at 1365 & n.24 (citing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409,
3426 (1982)). The court also found support for its conclusion that Noerr immunity was
based on the Sherman Act from Supreme Court cases addressing the "state action" exemp-
tion to the Act. 694 F.2d at 1365 & n.24. However, the Fifth Circuit's reliance on the state
action cases of City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978), and
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976), seems misplaced. The state action exemp-
tion involves the application of the federal antitrust laws to states and corresponding no-
tions of federalism. See Davis, supra note 7, at 411; Comment, Antitrust Law-Municipal
Immunity-Application of the State Action Doctrine to Municipalities, 1979 Wis. L. REv.
570, 571; supra note 4. Lafayette addressed the extent to which the Parker state action
exemption shielded municipalities engaged in commercial activities. See Lafayette, 435 U.S.
at 391; Comment, supra, at 570-71. At issue in Cantor was whether private action, when
approved by the state, fell within the Parker exemption. 428 U.S. at 581; see supra note 4.
It is highly unlikely that the narrow focus of Lafayette and Cantor was intended to address
any premise on which Noerr was based. See Griffin, A Critique of the Justice Department's
Antitrust Guide for International Operations, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 215, 253 (1978) (feder-
alism was a "key factor" in Lafayette). Compare In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litig.,
474 F. Supp. 1072, 1084 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (citing Lafayette for the proposition that Noerr
represents a first amendment restriction on the Sherman Act) with Coastal States Mktg.,
Inc. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358, 1365 n.24 (5th Cir. 1983) (citing Lafayette for the proposition
that the Noerr doctrine is a result of statutory construction of the Sherman Act). One com-
mentator concludes from Lafayette that if commercial activities undertaken by a govern-
ment are not protected by the state action exemption, then petitioning such a government
official likewise would not be protected. Baker, Critique of the Antitrust Guide: A Rejoin-
der, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 255, 260 (1978); see George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool
Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25, 33 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
26 694 F.2d at 1365 (footnote omitted). The Coastal court relied on the Supreme Court
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In addition, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the Hunts' activi-
ties did not fall within the "sham" exception to Noerr17 which pre-
cludes immunity for activity "which is in fact a 'mere sham to
cover what is nothing more than an attempt to interfere with busi-
ness relationships of a competitor . . ,28 Although the Supreme
Court has not established a precise standard for determining when
litigation will be considered a "sham,"'29 Judge Rubin concluded
that on the basis of Noerr's progeny, petitioning will be an immune
activity as long as the petitioner does not act solely with anticom-
petitive motives.s° Reasoning that "multiple motivations" normally
decision in Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
During World War H, the defendant, a subsidiary of Union Carbide, was appointed "the
exclusive wartime agent to purchase and allocate vanadium" by the Canadian Government.
Id. at 695. Continental Ore brought a private antitrust action, alleging that the defendant
had violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 693. The Supreme Court distin-
guished Noerr, reasoning that the defendant's activity was commercial in nature, rather
than the political conduct envisioned by the Noerr Court. Id. at 707-08. Therefore, the
Court concluded, the defendants were subject to the antitrust laws for any anticompetitive
conduct. Id. The Coastal court reasoned that since in Continental Ore the Supreme Court
distinguished Noerr on factual grounds rather than declaring petitioning immunities inap-
plicable to foreign governments, the implication arose that petitioning immunity extended
to joint efforts to influence foreign governments. 694 F.2d at 1365. This view also has been
adopted by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice. See id. at 1365 n.25; Gov-
ernment Provides Antitrust Guide for International Operations, [Jan.-June] ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 799, at E-18 (Feb. 1, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Antitrust
Guide].
27 694 F.2d at 1368. Since the Hunts' threats to litigate "wherever and whenever" to
establish title to the crude oil were reasonably necessary to a sincere effort to settle the
dispute, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that such actions were immune from antitrust scrutiny.
Id. at 1367.
28 Id. (quoting Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144).
29 694 F.2d at 1371.
30 See id. at 1372. In support of its conclusion, the Fifth Circuit quoted New Motor
Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1981), in which the Supreme Court stated that
"'[d]ealers who press sham protests.., for the sole purpose of delaying the establishment
of competing dealerships may be vulnerable to suit under the federal antitrust laws."' 694
F.2d at 1372 (quoting Orrin, 439 U.S. at 110 n.15) (emphasis in original); cf. Clipper Exxp-
ress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d 1240, 1254 (9th Cir. 1982)
("[g]enuine efforts to induce governmental action are shielded by Noerr even if their express
and sole purpose is to stifle or eliminate competition"), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1234 (1983).
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit noted that in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 417 U.S.
901 (1974), the Supreme Court summarily afirmed the lower court decision, which applied a
"principle purpose" test in recognizing that anticompetitive and other reasons motivate a
party to seek litigation. 694 F.2d at 1371. Although the Otter Tail Court merely approved of
the result reached by the lower court, and not its rationale, Judge Rubin reasoned that the
Otter Tail opinion suggested a "principle purpose test." Id. Moreover, Judge Rubin noted
that lower courts have recognized that "anticompetitive motives do not taint a suit filed, at
least in part, in hope of judicial relief." Id. at 1372; see Alexander v. National Farmers Org.,
687 F.2d 1173, 1200 (8th Cir. 1982).
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underlie a decision to institute legal proceedings, 1 Judge Rubin
stated that to establish petitioning immunity the "significant moti-
vating factor" must be a "genuine desire for judicial relief. '3 2 After
reviewing the evidence, including Coastal's pretrial stipulation that
one of Hunts' motives in instituting the legal proceedings was a
genuine effort to seek judicial relief,33 Judge Rubin concluded that
it was unnecessary to instruct the jury on the "sham" issue."'
In upholding the application of Noerr immunity to the solici-
tation of foreign governments, it is submitted that the Coastal
court properly concluded that the petitioning exemption rests on
statutory grounds.3 5 This Comment will analyze the statutory basis
31 694 F.2d at 1371.
32 Id. at 1372. The Coastal court noted that the burden of proof necessary to establish a
"sham" exception is similar to that required of a public employee attempting to prove that
he was terminated for engaging in "constitutionally protected conduct." Id. at 1372 n.45; see
Givhan v. Western Lines Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 416 (1979). The court reasoned
that the standard was identical to that utilized in fourteenth amendment adjudications. 694
F.2d at 1372 n.45; see Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284
(1977).
" 694 F.2d at 1371. The Fifth Circuit refused to "disturb" the stipulations before the
district court, since the lower court was better situated to ascertain the parties' intent. Id. at
1369-70. The only possible instances of bad faith that the Fifth Circuit could specify were
the large number of unsuccessful lawsuits initiated by the Hunts and the dismissal of the
suits after a settlement with the Libyan Government. Id. at 1369 n.37.
Id. at 1367.
35 The Fifth Circuit previously espoused the view that "the [Noerr] doctrine is rooted
in the first amendment's ... right to petition." Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v.
Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 542 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979). The Coastal
court's holding that Noerr is premised on statutory construction is not without support,
however. See, e.g., Costillo, Antitrust's Newest Quagmire: The Noerr-Pennington Defense,
66 MiH. L. REv. 333, 338 (1967) (whether petitioning violates the antitrust laws is a ques-
tion of statutory construction); cf. Baker, Exchange of Information for Presentation to Gov-
ernment Agencies: The Interplay of the Container and Noerr Doctrines, 44 ANTrTRusT L.J.
354, 367 (1975) (Noerr "is sufficiently ambiguous to be read on either or both grounds").
But see McManis, Questionable Corporate Payments Abroad: An Antitrust Approach, 86
YALE L.J. 215, 240 (1976) (Noerr rests on constitutional underpinnings); Note, Antitrust:
The Brakes Fail on the Noerr Doctrine-Trucking, Unlimited v. California Motor Transp.
Co. (N.D. Cal. 1967), 57 CALI. L. REv. 518, 532, 536 (1969) (Noerr is based on first amend-
ment grounds). The legislative history cited by the Coastal court appears to buttress the
conclusion that the Sherman Act was not intended to prohibit joint solicitation for the pur-
pose of influencing the legislature. See 694 F.2d at 1364 n.21 (quoting Senator Sherman).
Senator Sherman, discussing petitioning, stated that the Act
does not interfere in the slightest degree with voluntary associations made to af-
fect public opinion to advance the interests of a particular trade or occupation
.... And so the combinations of working men to promote their interests, pro-
mote their welfare, and increase their pay if you please, to get their fair share in
the division of production, are not affected in the slightest degree, nor can they be
included in the words or intent of the bill as now reported.
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of the Noerr decision and suggest that the rule of reason should
determine when Noerr immunity may be applied to attempts to
influence foreign governments.
THE BASIS OF Noerr PETITIONING IMMUNITY
In Noerr, Pennsylvania truckers alleged that twenty-four east-
ern railroads had violated the Sherman Act by undertaking a joint
publicity campaign to persuade state legislatures to enact laws
"destructive of the trucking business."36 The Supreme Court rea-
soned that two considerations militated against a finding that joint
petitioning was prohibited by the Act:
[First,] [t]o hold that the government retains the power to act in
this representative capacity and yet hold, at the same time, that
the people cannot freely inform the government of their wishes
would impute to the Sherman Act a purpose to regulate, not busi-
ness activity, but political activity, a purpose which would have
no basis whatever in the legislative history of that Act. Secondly,
and of at least equal significance, such a construction of the Sher-
man Act would raise important constitutional questions.37
The Noerr exemption similarly was at issue in California Mo-
tor Transport v. Trucking Unlimited,3s which extended the ex-
emption to protect joint petitioning of administrative agencies
from Sherman Act liability.3 9 The Court stated that Noerr was
21 CONG. REC. 2562 (1889).
36 365 U.S. 127, 129 (1961). The truckers alleged that the "sole purpose" of the rail-
roads' campaign was to reduce competition in the long-distance freight business, thus de-
stroying the trucking industry as competition. Id. In addition, the truckers complained of
the third-party technique employed by the railroads, whereby disparaging publicity was
made to appear as the remarks of independent third parties, rather than the statements of
the railroads. Id. at 130.
37 Id. at 137-38 (footnote omitted). The Court noted that it could not "lightly impute"
an intent to impinge the first amendment right of petition. Id. at 138. If petitioning consti-
tuted nothing more than anticompetitive conduct, however, the Court reasoned that the
Sherman Act may prohibit such activity. See id. at 144; supra notes 29-34 and accompany-
ing text. In United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), the Noerr exemption
was reaffirmed in the context of an action involving joint petitioning by a labor union and
employers to persuade a public official to pass uniform labor standards. Id. at 660, 670. The
Court concluded that "Noerr shields from the Sherman Act a concerted effort to influence
public officials regardless of intent or purpose." Id. at 670; see Davis, supra note 7, at 413.
- 404 U.S. 508 (1972). In California Motor Transport, highway carriers alleged that
competitors had instituted proceedings in federal and state courts to "defeat applications by
[Trucking Unlimited] to acquire operating rights," id. at 509, intending to "harass and deter
[Trucking Unlimited] in its use of administrative and judicial proceedings," id. at 511.
39 Id. at 509-11.
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based on a statutory construction of the Sherman Act and on the
first amendment right of petition.40 Noting that the same "philoso-
phy" applied to petitioning of courts and administrative agencies,"1
Justice Douglas opined that to preclude groups from soliciting
state and federal agencies by imposing antitrust sanctions "would
be destructive of rights of association and of petition .. "..42
In Coastal, Judge Rubin noted that the Supreme Court had
expressly declined to address the first amendment issue in Noerr.4'
The Noerr Court found that first amendment rights impliedly were
protected by the Sherman Act, since it could not "lightly impute to
Congress an intent to invade these freedoms."'44 Thus, the Su-
preme Court was cognizant of the constitutional difficulties that
would result if the Sherman Act were held to impinge first amend-
ment freedoms by barring joint efforts to influence government
action.
The Coastal court's conclusion that California Motor Trans-
port did not overrule the Noerr construction of the Sherman Act
recognizes that the "elevation" of the Noerr doctrine to one based
on the first amendment 5 would not eviscerate the Court's prior
construction of the Act.46 This conclusion seems even more appro-
priate in light of other considerations which suggest that Califor-
nia Motor Transport was not constitutionally based.
First, although the Supreme Court takes cognizance of any
constitutional issue which may affect the outcome of a decision,
the mere involvement of such an issue in the Court's decisionmak-
ing process does not convert the decision into one resting on con-
stitutional grounds."8 The Court's recognition of the rights of asso-
40 Id. at 510. The Court noted that the right of access to the courts is part of the first
amendment right of petition. Id.
41 Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 39-40.
42 404 U.S. at 510-11.
43 694 F.2d at 1364-65 & 1365 n.22; see Noerr, 365 U.S. at 132 n.6. The Noerr Court
stated that it was not necessary to consider first amendment issues because of the Court's
"view . . . of the proper construction of the Sherman Act. . . ." 365 U.S. at 132 n.6.
44 365 U.S. at 137-38; see Comment, Corporate Lobbyists Abroad: The Extraterritorial
Application of the Noerr-Pennington Antitrust Immunity, 61 CALiF. L. Rav. 1254, 1258
n.31 (1973).
45 See Coastal, 694 F.2d at 1364-65; 2 M. HANDLER, TWENTY-FIvE YEARS OF ANTrrRUST
1021-22 (1973).
46 694 F.2d at 1365.
47 See, e.g., Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 507 (1959); Barenblatt v. United States,
360 U.S. 109, 140 n.7 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting); Lee v. Madigan, 358 U.S. 228, 235
(1959); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958).
48 See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958). In Dulles, the plaintiffs alleged
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ciation and petition in California Motor Transport evidences such
a sensitivity to those rights without making them the basis for its
holding.49 Second, this conclusion is supported by the Court's rec-
ognition that its proper function is to decide "cases and controver-
sies" under Article I.5 If a case properly can be adjudicated
without addressing a constitutional issue, the Court usually will
not base its holding on constitutional grounds.5 1 Since Noerr in-
volved statutory construction rather than constitutional interpre-
tation, it is probable that California Motor Transport similarly
was not constitutionally based.
Because of the broad first amendment language in California
Motor Transport, it unquestionably is difficult to ascertain when
the first amendment, rather than the Sherman Act, is determina-
tive in a given case. However, given the Court's traditional re-
straint with respect to passing on constitutional issues, and the
Court's adherence to statutory precepts in Noerr, the conclusion
that Noerr petitioning is statutorily based appears justifiable.2
that two passports were denied by the Director of the Passport Office because of the appli-
cants' political affiliation. Id. at 117-18. Although the Court recognized that the constitu-
tional right to travel was invoked, it expressly noted that it need not address that issue. Id.
at 129-30.
49 See California Motor Transport, 404 U.S. at 510-11. It is submitted that California
Motor Transport stands for the proposition that the existence of first amendment rights
does not necessarily immunize one from the antitrust laws. This appears to be the logical
interpretation of that case in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Bill Johnson's
Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 103 S. Ct. 2161 (1983). In Bill Johnson's, the Court construed
the National Labor Relations Act with reference to first amendment rights, particularly the
right of access to the courts. Id. at 2169. The Court concluded that "the prosecution of an
improperly motivated suit lacking a reasonable basis constitutes a violation of the [NLRA]
that may be enjoined by the [NLRB]." Id. at 2171. Although Bill Johnson's import lies in
the area of labor-management relations, its antitrust implications are clear--one would be
hard pressed to justify California Motor Transport as a decision premised on the first
amendment.
50 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173-74 (1803); U.S. CONST. art. M, §
2. See generally J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNo, CONSTrrUiONAL LAw 54-85 (1978)
(examining the "cases and controversies" doctrine).
51 See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring) (Court will not pass on a constitutional question presented by the record
when the case may be disposed of on another ground); Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.,
213 U.S. 175, 193 (1909) (question of due process not reached where action of railroad com-
mission was beyond statutory power); United States v. Graves, 554 F.2d 65, 77 n.40 (3d Cir.
1977) (questions of constitutional validity may be avoided by a "saving" interpretation of
the legislative enactment); Negron v. Warden, Hartford Community Correctional Center,
180 Conn. 153, 429 A.2d 841, 847 (1980) (alternative claim of violation of Connecticut con-
stitution not addressed in recognition of judicial policy of self-restraint).
11 Interestingly, because the broad first amendment language in California Motor
Transport allows for a less complex analysis based solely on constitutional grounds, it ap-
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ANALYZING THE Coastal EXTENSION OF Noerr TO PETITIONING OF
FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS
It is suggested that the Coastal court, in determining that pe-
titioning of foreign governments is immune from the antitrust
laws, failed to recognize that the statutory basis underlying the
Noerr doctrine may not fully be applicable abroad. It is submitted,
however, that an approach does exist which both reflects the un-
derlying premise of Noerr and facilitates a proper application of
the petitioning immunity doctrine to foreign governments.
Since Noerr apparently was based on statutory, and not on
constitutional considerations, it appears that the petitioning doc-
trine has equal applicability to activity engaged in outside the
United States. Indeed, foreign governments have as much of an
interest in making informed decisions concerning trade regulation
as their American counterpart."3 The difference, however, is that
Noerr petitioning immunity is premised on the legislative system
of the United States, in which the Legislature acts as the will of
the people." Because the same representative process that under-
pears that most courts have eschewed the more cumbersome task of analyzing cases in terms
of both first amendment and Sherman Act concerns. See, e.g., Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky
Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, 674 F.2d 1252, 1265-66 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 1234 (1983); City of Kirkwood v. Union Elec. Co., 671 F.2d 1173, 1181 (8th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 814 (1983); In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litig., 474 F. Supp.
1072, 1084 (N.D. Cal. 1979); United States v. Braniff Airways, 453 F. Supp. 724, 730-31
(W.D. Tex. 1978). Courts and commentators have opined that the repetition of broad first
amendment language throughout the California Motor Transport opinion demonstrates
that the decision was based on an application of the first amendment. See Clipper Exxp-
ress, 674 F.2d at 1265 & n.21; In re Airport Antitrust Litig., 474 F. Supp. at 1083-84; Fis-
chel, supra note 3, at 88.
53 See B1 I. BAFL & J. BmJLis, WORLD LAW OF COMPzTMON § 1.01, at 1-1 to -2 (1982).
54 See California Motor Transport, 404 U.S. at 510 (citing Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137);
Comment, supra note 44, at 1275. The Fifth Circuit's failure to acknowledge the differences
between government in the United States and government in foreign nations is the major
defect in the Court's application of Noerr to petitioning in the international context. More-
over, the Court's reliance on Continental Ore in determining that petitioning immunity ex-
tends to foreign governments, see 694 F.2d at 1365; supra note 26, does not appear justifia-
ble. As several courts and commentators have suggested, resolution of the petitioning
immunity question was unnecessary to the holding in Continental Ore and, therefore, no
implications may properly be drawn from that case. See, e.g., Occidental Petroleum Corp. v.
Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 107 (C.D. Cal. 1971), afl'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972); Comment, supra note 44, at 1269. Similarly, any reliance
on the Department of Justice Merger Guidelines to support an extension of Noerr immunity
to petitioning in the international arena appears improper, since the Guidelines adopt the
same reading of Continental Ore as the Coastal court did. See 694 F.2d at 1365 n.25; Anti-
trust Guide, supra note 26, at E-18; supra note 26. Indeed, the Justice Department has
cautioned against any reliance on the Guidelines, noting that they are "intended to be of
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lies the Noerr rationale does not necessarily operate outside the
United States, an extension of Noerr immunity abroad to the ex-
tent it is enjoyed domestically may result in the formation of an-
ticompetitive arrangements which would not be tolerated within
the United States.5 Conversely, a complete failure to apply the
Noerr doctrine to petitioning of foreign governments may result in
conflicts between Sherman Act enforcement policies and sensitive
issues concerning foreign sovereignty.56 Such an approach, in addi-
tion to being inconsistent with the holding in Noerr that petition-
ing of government officials is not within the scope of the Sherman
Act, also would be inconsistent with the deep-rooted policy of
American courts not to pass judgment on the political activity of
another sovereign.57 Indeed, this practice has sparked a significant
amount of retaliatory conduct, including the enactment of foreign
statutes curtailing the effectiveness of American antitrust enforce-
ment.5 8 Therefore, it is suggested that a flexible approach is neces-
assistance to-and not a substitute for-experienced private antitrust counsel." Antitrust
Guide, supra note 26, at E-1.
55 See Comment, supra note 44, at 1273. One commentator has suggested that, because
the American representative process is not at work outside the United States, there should
be no extension of Noerr immunity to petitioning of foreign governments. Id. at 1275, 1277.
8 Davis, supra note 7, at 429.
17 See International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 649 F.2d
1354, 1358 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); Davis, supra note 7, at 429.
1 Davis, supra note 7, at 434. The Westinghouse uranium litigation is the most note-
worthy case to have provoked retaliatory conduct. See In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617
F.2d 1248, 1259 (7th Cir. 1980). In 1973, a uranium cartel was established among several
foreign corporations, possibly with the approval of their respective governments. Kohlmeier,
The Uranium Affair, 13 J. IN'iL L. & ECON. 149, 150, 152-(1978). After the formation of the
cartel, uranium prices escalated from $9 per pound to $40 per pound. Id. at 150. Westing-
house abrogated its long term supply contracts, claiming commercial impracticability due to
rising costs. Id. at 151. Westinghouse then filed suit in the district court against 29 foreign
and American uranium producers, alleging price fixing. Id.; In re Uranium Antitrust Litig.,
473 F. Supp. 382, 384-85 (N.D. IMI. 1979). Westinghouse sought testimony and documents
from several foreign governments to prove its anticompetitive theory. Re Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. and Duquesne Light Co., 16 Ont. 2d 273, 276-77 (1977). As a direct result of the
American application of antitrust laws to activities conducted on foreign soil, the Australian
Government, for example, enacted a statute revoking the enforceability of American anti-
trust judgments. See Recent Developments, Antitrust: Australian Restrictions on Enforce-
ment of Foreign Judgments, 20 Hv. INT'L L.J. 663, 665 n.14 (1979). The Australian stat-
ute provides that:
Where ... a foreign court has . . .given a judgment in proceedings instituted
under an antitrust law ... the Attorney-General may ... in the case of any judg-
ment-by order in writing, declare that the judgment shall not be recognized as
enforceable in Australia ....
Austl. Acts No. 13 of 1979.
A more common form of retaliation is the enactment of blocking statutes which prevent
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sary to balance the important American interest in safeguarding its
commerce against the legitimate interest of foreign sovereigns in
regulating political activity within their own territory.9
The Rule of Reason
It is suggested that the "rule of reason," a recognized mode of
antitrust analysis,60 is applicable to an extension of Noerr petition-
ing immunity to efforts to influence foreign governments. As stated
by Justice Powell, "[u]nder this rule, the factfinder weighs all of
the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive prac-
tice should be deemed anticompetitive."61 The market share of the
discovery procedures within foreign countries by American courts. Davis, supra note 7, at
435-36. In United States v. The Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 1963
Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1962), the district court declared that agree-
ments among Swiss and American watchmakers were violative of section 1 of the Sherman
Act. Id. at 77,455. The Swiss Government was angered by and protested strenuously an
alleged failure of American courts to recognize Swiss sovereignty. Comment, supra note 44,
at 1277.
59 But see Davis, supra note 7, at 429. Davis suggests a rigid, per se application of
Noerr to petitioning of foreign governments. Id. The use of a strict standard to protect
foreign petitioning, however, does not appear to recognize the potential anticompetitive
harm from foreign trade restrictions. Such an approach is also inconsistent with the purpose
of the antitrust laws, which is to prevent restraints of trade. See supra note 3.
60 See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 3, at 172.
61 Continental T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977); see Zelek,
Stern & Dunfee, A Rule of Reason Decision Model After Sylvania, 68 CALIF. L. Rlv. 13, 14
& n.12 (1980). Congress, cognizant of the fact that in enacting the Sherman Act it could not
envisage every conceivable anticompetitive situation that may arise, gave considerable dis-
cretion to the judiciary. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
688 n.11 (1978). Senator Sherman has noted:
The first section [§ 1], being a remedial statute, would be construed liberally, with
a view to promote its object. It defines a civil remedy, and the courts will construe
it liberally; they will prescribe the precise limits of the constitutional power of the
government; they will distinguish between lawful combinations in aid of produc-
tion and unlawful combinations to prevent competition and restraint of trade;
they can operate on corporations by restraining orders and rules; they can declare
the particular combination null and void and deal with it according to the nature
and extent of the injuries.
21 CONG. REC. 2456-57 (1890) (summarizing statements of Senator Sherman). Because the
rule has few precise guidelines, cases involving similar facts have been decided inconsis-
tently. Compare Buffalo Broadcasting Co. v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors and
Publishers, 546 F. Supp. 274, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("blanket licensing of music performing
rights unreasonably restrains trade") with Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. American Soc'y of
Composers, Authors and Publishers, 620 F.2d 930, 939 (2d Cir. 1980) (blanket licensing pro-
cedure not proved unreasonably to restrain trade). Foreign policy concerns and the paucity
of antitrust case law in international contexts suggest that the rule of reason has greater
applicability internationally than in purely domestic cases. See, e.g., Antitrust Guide, supra
note 26, at E-2; Beausang, The Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the Sherman Act, 70 DicK.
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party, the characteristics particular to the trade or industry, the
nature of the restriction, the intent of the parties, and the possibil-
ity of less restrictive means of accomplishing the business purpose
are considerations for the court when it determines whether an act
is in restraint of trade.6 2 These competing considerations mandate
flexibility in the rule of reason approach, making it particularly
useful in the international context, where competing interests are
even more complex.
Application of the Rule of Reason
Before adjudication of an antitrust action in an American
court is possible, certain jurisdictional requirements first must be
satisfied.6 3 Although jurisdiction over international transactions
previously was not permitted,6 4 the Court now exercises jurisdic-
tion over anticompetitive conduct occurring outside the United
States when that conduct has a substantial impact on American
L. REv. 187, 196-97 (1966).
In addition to the more flexible rule of reason approach, the Court will at times use a
per se methodology. Under the per se rule, certain conduct is considered so pernicious and
anticompetitive that, in the interests of predictability and finality of litigation, no extended
review of the factual context is necessary to establish illegality. Zelek, Stem & Dunfee,
supra, at 13 n.2 (quoting National Soc'y of Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 692); see, e.g., Arizona v.
Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 347 (1982) (agreements among competitors to
fix maximum prices); United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (horizontal
division of markets); United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 147-48 (1966)
(boycotts to eliminate discount dealers); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6
(1958) (tying arrangements).
Interestingly, application of Noerr petitioning immunity in the domestic context ap-
pears to be analogous to a per se concept. Once it is determined that a defendant's activity
is undertaken to inform representatives in government of the defendant's desires, courts will
not question whether there might be a damaging effect on competition or on competitors.
Noerr, 365 U.S. at 139-40. Indeed, the Court has recognized that it is "neither unusual nor
illegal for people to seek action on laws in the hope that they may bring about an advantage
to themselves and a disadvantage to their competitors." Id. at 139.
62 Note, Territorial and Customer Restrictions: A Trend Toward a Broader Rule of
Reason?, 40 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 123, 126-27 (1971); see Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). For a restraint to be deemed illegal under a rule of reason
analysis, the anticompetitive effects of the particular activity must outweigh its procompeti-
tive effects. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors and Pub-
lishers, 620 F.2d 930, 934 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 970 (1981).
63 See E. KINTNER & E. JOELSON, AN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST PRIMER 21-22 (1974).
Just as the Legislature gave considerable discretion to the judiciary to determine what con-
duct is anticompetitive, it also left discretion with the courts to determine when to exercise
jurisdiction over foreign transactions. See B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND
INTERNATIONAL ANTrrRUS. A CompAmuTVE GumE 22 n.12 (1981).
" See In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1253 (7th Cir. 1980).
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The same considerations that apply in determining jurisdic-
tion also apply in assessing the applicability of petitioning immu-
nity. Thus, the United States appears to have little interest in the
advocacy of foreign legislation which has little or no impact on
American commerce. This analysis is consistent with the antitrust
jurisprudence that measures the "substantiality" of a restraint of
trade before labeling it illegal." It also is consistent with the Fifth
Circuit's criterion in determining when a particular petitioning ac-
tivity is a "sham. 67 The rule of reason is the standard by which to
measure this "substantiality" in the international arena. Thus, it is
submitted that an approach which provides for an evaluation of
the nature, purpose and impact of the particular petitioning con-
duct is the proper method for determining the international appli-
cability of petitioning immunity in any particular case.
The rule of reason as applied to the conduct of the Hunts in
Coastal suggests the same result as that reached by the Fifth Cir-
cuit. The record established that the conduct was undertaken to
secure title rights reasonably subject to dispute rather than to fur-
ther an anticompetitive purpose.6 " By publicizing their title claim,
threatening litigation, and pressuring purchasers of the national-
ized crude, the Hunts acted to effect title to the oil.6 The means
utilized were no broader than necessary to achieve that goal.70 It is
suggested that, weighing all these factors, a court applying a rule of
65 B. HAWK, supra note 63, at 22; see In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d at 1253;
E. KiNTNER & E. JOELSON, supra note 63, at 25; Baker, supra note 25, at 273; see also
Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 641 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 871
(1956); Securities and Exch. Comm'n. v. Myers, 285 F. Supp. 743, 746 (D. Md. 1968). Begin-
ning with United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927), in which the Supreme
Court concluded that deliberate acts outside the United States that tend to restrain trade
within the United States confer jurisdiction on American courts, id. at 276, a consistently
broader application of the Sherman Act which included international activities has been
imposed, see Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 282-86 (1952) ("'Congress has the
power to prevent unfair trade practices in foreign commerce by citizens of the United
States, although some of the acts are done outside the territorial limits of the United
States'") (quoting Branch v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 141 F.2d 31, 35 (7th Cir. 1944));
Beausang, supra note 61, at 187; Comment, supra note 44, at 1264. For a discussion of
subject matter jurisdiction under the Sherman Act, see Kramer, The Application of the
Sherman Act to Foreign Commerce, 3 ANTITRUST BULL. 387, 390-400 (1958).
00 See supra note 3.
7 See 694 F.2d at 1372; supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
8 694 F.2d at 1372; see supra notes 29-34.




reason approach similarly would conclude that the conduct was
protected under the Noerr doctrine.
CONCLUSION
Although the Noerr doctrine of petitioning immunity espouses
first amendment concerns, it more importantly recognizes that the
Sherman Act does not prohibit joint efforts to influence public offi-
cials with respect to the passage or enforcement of laws. Reason
therefore dictates that petitioning immunity should protect activi-
ties undertaken to influence foreign sovereigns. Recognition of
both the varying political systems of foreign nations and the dispa-
rate levels of foreign antitrust enforcement leads to the conclusion
that a full extension of Noerr might result in legislation that would
not pass constitutional muster within the United States. Similarly,
a nonextension of petitioning immunity might lead American
courts to assess political activity within other nations.
These competing considerations point toward the use of the
rule of reason by the judiciary when analyzing petitioning of for-
eign sovereigns as a possible violation of American antitrust laws.
Courts have been given wide discretion in the enforcement of the
provisions of the Sherman Act. There appears to be no reason why
the judiciary cannot exercise the same discretion when determining
whether Noerr petitioning immunity is available in the interna-
tional context.
Douglas Wamsley
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